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The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act Section 38: The 
implications of Paterson v Harvie     
 
Introduction 
The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 section 38 created 
a new statutory offence of behaving in a threatening or abusive manner. 
Such an offence was deemed necessary after the test for the actus reus of 
breach of the peace was restated in Smith v Donnelly 1 and affirmed in 
the Full Bench decision of Harris v H. M. Advocate 2 The consequence of 
these decisions was that many instances of rowdy, disorderly or verbally 
violent behaviour that were once prosecuted as breaches of the peace no 
longer fell within the scope of that offence unless the conduct complained 
of also amounted to the common law crime of uttering threats or some 
other statutory offence; conduct that would have been considered worthy 
of the attention of the police and procurator fiscal had it still been open to 
them to take action. 
In August 2014 a Bench of five judges gave its interpretation of the 
conduct required for the actus reus of a contravention of section 38. This 
article begins by setting out the changes to the test for breach of the 
peace set out in Smith3 which brought about the need for the new 
offence. It then examines the reported cases in which section 38 was 
interpreted up to and including Paterson v Harvie4 and considers the likely 
effect of the decision. Finally it suggests that section 38 as drafted and 
interpreted in Paterson5, and breach of the peace still may not catch all 
the examples of non- aggravated disorderly conduct in which action by 
the police and procurator fiscal would appear to be indicated. 
Breach of the Peace 
                                       
1 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
2 [2009] HCJAC 80, 2010 J.C.245, 2009 S.L.T 1078, 2010 S.C.L 56, 2010 S.C.C.R 
931, 2010 G.W.D 35-724 
3 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
4 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 S.C.C.R 
521, 2014 GWD  26-517 
5 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 S.C.C.R 
521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517   
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 As any student of criminal law should be able to tell you, prior to 
the decision of the High Court of Justiciary in Smith6 the type of conduct 
required for the actus reus of breach of the peace was said to be conduct 
of almost any kind that either, did cause or was reasonably likely to have 
caused, fear, alarm, upset, annoyance or distress to another or others. 
This has led over the years to conduct as diverse as fighting, shouting and 
swearing, energetic and persistent begging, unconvincing cross dressing, 
glue sniffing, playing football in the street, peeping tom type behaviour, 
walking naked in public, and attempting to have sexual intercourse with a 
bicycle in a locked room in a hostel, being prosecuted successfully as 
breach of the peace.7 The actus reus of breach of the peace was restated 
in Smith as “conduct severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary people and 
threaten serious disturbance in the community” and “conduct which does 
present as genuinely alarming and disturbing in its context to any 
reasonable person.”8 In the absence of evidence that the alleged 
disorderly conduct resulted in actual alarm, then to justify a conviction the 
conduct required to be ‘flagrant’ 9 
 The restatement of the test in Smith10 had the practical effect of 
significantly raising the threshold of seriousness of the conduct required to 
commit breach of the peace. As the High Court anticipated, this 
clarification had the effect of removing some types of conduct from the 
ambit of the offence altogether. As it noted, conduct including the mere 
use of bad language, or the refusal to co-operate with the police “even if 
forcefully or truculently stated,”11 would no longer meet the test.  
Similarly prosecutions of deeds done or utterances spoken in private 
                                       
6 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
7 See for example, Saltman v Allan 1989 SLT 262, Derret v Lockhart 1991 SCCR 
109, Wyness, v Lockhart 1992 SCCR 808, Stewart v Lockhart 1991 SLT 835, 
Cameron v Normand, 1992 SCCR 866, MacDougall v Dochree 1992 JC154, and 
Robert Stewart (Unreported,13 November  2007, Ayr Sheriff  Court) cited in P. R 
Ferguson and C. McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law, A Critical Analysis , 2nd edn 
(Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press 2014) paras 15.2.7,15.2.8 15.3.2 
8 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 at 
[20] 
9 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 at 
[21] 
10 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
11 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 at 
[20] 
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because of the unpleasant or disgusting nature of the conduct rather than 
any risk that it would provoke a disturbance would be no longer likely to 
meet the test. Smith12 was affirmed in the Full Bench decision of Harris v 
H.M. Advocate.13  Harris was accused of making comments to one police 
officer in person within the confines of the police station, and to another 
over the telephone that he knew where they and their families lived, and 
held personal information about their financial circumstances. Even 
though there was clear evidence that the officers found this alarming and 
distressing, the court ordered that the charges be dismissed as irrelevant 
because the conduct lacked the essential public element. Lord Justice –
General Hamilton stated: “If, as we hold it to be, it is necessary to 
constitute breach of the peace that the conduct, in some sense must 
threaten serious disturbance to the community, it is difficult to see how a 
statement made in private by one person to another can, without more, 
constitute breach of the peace.” 14 
 The effect of these decisions on the prospects of success for 
prosecutions for verbal domestic abuse committed in the relative privacy 
of the home was raised in Hatcher v Harrower.15 The court acknowledged 
that where that public element was lacking, as it was in Hatcher,16 then 
such disturbances could not be prosecuted successfully as breaches of the 
peace. The court did not go so far as to hold that verbal domestic abuse 
could never amount to breach of the peace. Whether the test is met will 
depend on the facts and circumstances in the context of each case. In 
Hatcher,17 although the couple’s children were in the house there was no 
finding that they or any other witnesses had heard or were affected by the 
disturbance. 
                                       
12 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
13 [2009] HCJAC 80, 2010 J.C.245, 2009 S.L.T 1078, 2010 S.C.L 56, 2010 
S.C.C.R 931, 2010 G.W.D 35-724 
13 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
14 [2009] HCJAC 80, 2010 J.C.245, 2009 S.L.T 1078, 2010 S.C.L 56, 2010 
S.C.C.R 931, 2010 G.W.D 35-724 at [16] 
15 [2010] HCJAC 76, 2011 J.C 90, 2011 S.C.L 114, 2010 S.C.C.R 903, 2010 GWD 
30-617 
16 [2010] HCJAC 76, 2011 J.C 90, 2011 S.C.L 114, 2010 S.C.C.R 903, 2010 GWD 
30-617 
17 [2010] HCJAC 76, 2011 J.C 90, 2011 S.C.L 114, 2010 S.C.C.R 903, 2010 GWD 
30-617 
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This left the criminal justice agencies with the problem of what to do 
about private conduct that was psychologically damaging, genuinely 
frightening, alarming or distressing in its context, but did not involve 
violence, or which would not otherwise have given grounds for charges of 
assault or making threats. The Scottish Government, which claimed to be 
supportive of victims of domestic abuse, was faced with a gap in the 
criminal law. It appeared that swift action was required.  
A statutory solution  
 In an attempt to address the mischief highlighted in Hatcher18, John 
Lamont MSP proposed an amendment to the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Bill. Mr Lamont’s version of the offence required only 
that the accused behave in such a manner that another person would be 
likely to be caused fear, alarm or distress. This has echoes of the pre 
Smith19 test for breach of the peace set out in such cases as Wilson v 
Brown20. Although the lack of specification of the nature or severity of the 
conduct required may have led to challenges, the section did have a much 
narrower intended application than the Government amendment which 
eventually became section 38. Mr Lamont’s proposed offence applied only 
to persons in a relationship such that the victim would have been eligible 
to apply for a matrimonial or domestic interdict under the Matrimonial 
Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981.  
 In the event, Mr Lamont’s amendment was withdrawn after the 
Scottish Government introduced what would become section 38 of the 
2010 Act at Stage 3 of the progress of the Bill. Section 38 does not 
abolish or replace breach of the peace. Addressing the Justice Committee 
on 30 June 2010 then Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill gave examples of 
the type of conduct that the section was intended to address:” I am 
talking about people who, for example, shout abuse at policemen when no 
other members of the public are present or shout abuse in their home as 
                                       
18 [2010] HCJAC 76, 2011 J.C 90, 2011 S.C.L 114, 2010 S.C.C.R 903, 2010 GWD 
30-617 
19 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
20 1982 SLT 361, 1982 S.C.C.R 49 
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a form of domestic violence.”21 The foregrounding of the reference to 
shouting abuse at police officers rather than domestic abuse suggests that 
the Scottish Government may have been more concerned about the 
former mischief than the latter.  
Section 38 
 Section 38 (1) states that a person ‘A’ commits an offence if- (a) A 
behaves in a threatening or abusive manner, (b) the behaviour would be 
likely to cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm and c) A 
intends by the behaviour to cause fear or alarm or is reckless as to 
whether the behaviour would cause fear or alarm. Section 38(2) provides 
that it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection 
(1) to show that the behaviour was in the particular circumstances 
reasonable. The type of behaviour required is defined as, “behaviour of 
any kind including in particular things said or communicated or done.22 
The section applies both to single incidents and to courses of conduct.23 
“Threatening” or “abusive” are not defined in the Act. 
The offence is triable on indictment or summarily. The maximum penalties 
are imprisonment not exceeding 5 years, a fine, or both for convictions on 
indictment and imprisonment for not more than 12 months, a fine not 
exceeding the statutory maximum, or both, on summary complaint. 
Contraventions of section 38 can also be dealt with by means of a fiscal 
fine but not by police antisocial behaviour penalty notice. 
Judicial Interpretation of Section 38 
 Three reported cases so far have considered the appropriate 
interpretation of section 38(1). This part of the article examines these 
judgements. In Rooney v Brown24 the charge libelled that the appellant 
shouted, swore and uttered sectarian and racist threats of violence both in 
public and while in a police van en route for the police office; conduct said 
to have been aggravated by racial and religious prejudice. The evidence 
was to the effect that the police officers did not suffer fear and alarm 
                                       
21 Scottish Parliament, Official Report, Meeting of the Parliament 30 June 2010 
thttp://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=5608&
mode=html [Accessed February 17 2016 
22 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 s38(3)(a) 
23 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 s 38(3)(b) 
24 [2013] HCJAC 57, 2013 S.C.L 615, 2013 S.C.C.R 334, 2013 G.W.D 17-354 
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themselves, but the sheriff convicted because he was satisfied that the 
remarks were likely to cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm.  
Lady Dorrian, delivering the opinion of the court, stated that the matter 
was “not to be decided by the reaction of individual police officers but on 
an objective basis.” at [6] The court required to look at the matter from 
“the standpoint of the reasonable man placed in the shoes of these police 
officers. We have to assume that the behaviour occurs in the presence of 
such a person, we do not require to consider the likelihood of the remarks 
actually reaching such a person.” at [6] In the context in which the 
conduct took place, the court held that the sheriff was entitled to conclude 
that the appellant’s behaviour was likely to cause a reasonable person to 
suffer fear and alarm. In other words, provided the conduct was 
threatening or abusive in nature and provided the court concluded that, 
viewed objectively, such conduct would be likely to cause a reasonable 
person fear and alarm, and provided that the accused intended that to be 
the case or was reckless as to the effect of his behaviour on others, the 
offence was committed. 
 However, in August 2013, Jolly v H.M.Advocate25 cast doubt on the 
interpretation of section 38 set out in Rooney26. The decision had, for a 
time, the result of severely limiting the circumstances in which section 38 
could be used. The facts of the case were somewhat out of the ordinary. 
Andrew Jolly had been sentenced to a period of detention in 2011 after 
being convicted of contraventions of section 38 by sending offensive and 
threatening letters to a former girlfriend. During conversations he had had 
with social workers who were preparing pre-release reports, he was 
alleged to have made threats about the same ex-girlfriend and her family. 
No threats were directed to the social workers themselves but they 
reported being put in a state of fear and alarm on behalf of the young 
woman. He was indicted on two charges alleging contraventions of section 
38. Jolly objected to proceedings on the grounds of oppression, and also 
to the admissibility of the evidence of his comments made to the social 
workers. The case came before the High Court of Justiciary after the 
                                       
25 [2013] HCJAC 96, 2014 J.C. 171, 2013 S.L.T 1100, 2013 S.C.L 832 
26 [2013] HCJAC 57, 2013 S.C.L 615, 2013 S.C.C.R 334, 2013 G.W.D 17-354 
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Crown appealed the decision of the sheriff at a first diet to uphold the 
objection to the admissibility of the evidence, and the appellant appealed 
the decision to repel the plea of oppression.   
 The case turned on interpretation of section 38(1) and whether 
there required to be evidence of actual fear or alarm being suffered by the 
complainer or whether it was sufficient that a hypothetical reasonable 
person would be likely to suffer fear or alarm. The advocate depute 
argued that the terms of section 38 required behaviour that was 
threatening or abusive and where that behaviour was likely to cause a 
reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm that was sufficient for the actus 
reus of the offence. The section as framed did not require the behaviour 
to be directed to the person about whom the comments were made. 
Provided the behaviour, viewed objectively, was of a threatening or 
abusive nature then the court needed only to satisfy itself that it was such 
that it could cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm. Counsel for 
the appellant disagreed, arguing that there did require to be a complainer 
who was present at the time and to whom that conduct was directed. 
 Delivering the opinion of the Court, Lady Smith outlined the terms 
of section 38 and extrapolated from the section the following; 
“Accordingly, if a person behaves in a threatening or abusive manner, and 
that behaviour in fact (emphasis added) causes another person to feel 
fear or alarm, and (emphasis added) a reasonable person would have 
suffered fear or alarm in the circumstances and causing that fear and 
alarm was the intention of the person or at least he was reckless as to 
whether he caused it then, and only then, (emphasis added) has the 
offence in section 38 been committed.”27 She went on to say that it was 
not enough that the conduct caused someone to suffer fear and alarm. A 
reasonable person in a similar position would also require to have had the 
same reaction. However if all that could be said was that a hypothetical 
and absent reasonable person would have, had they been there, suffered 
fear or alarm then no contravention of section 38 will have occurred. 
While this interpretation had the advantage of avoiding convictions in 
situations where the an overly sensitive or nervous complainer suffered an 
                                       
27 [2013] HCJAC 96, 2014 J.C. 171, 2013 S.L.T 1100, 2013 S.C.L 832 at[28] 
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adverse reaction to innocuous conduct, it also seemed that it would 
exclude cases involving witnesses such as police officers and emergency 
workers, whose regular exposure to rowdy and abusive behaviour in the 
line of duty may have made them immune to the effects of all but the 
most egregious examples of such behaviour. The court considered that it 
would have been extraordinary had the Scottish Parliament intended to 
create an offence that could be committed without the need for actual fear 
and alarm which would have been shared by a reasonable person. 
Accordingly, it was held that Rooney28 was not authority for the 
proposition that there was no need under section 38(1) for any person 
present to suffer actual fear or alarm and could be distinguished on its 
facts from Jolly.29 The Court was satisfied that the legislation was 
intended to address situations only where there was a real (presumably 
reasonable) witness who had suffered real fear or alarm at the time the 
conduct took place. 
 It is not clear why the court insisted on there being evidence of the 
occurrence of actual fear and alarm. The section as passed did not 
expressly require it. Also, section 38 was passed to address the gap in the 
law which had appeared with the restatement of the test for the actus 
reus of breach of the peace. As Lord Justice- Clerk Carloway later noted in 
Montgomery v Harvie30 while it is not enough that the conduct alleged in a 
breach of the peace merely alarmed or disturbed someone, by the same 
token, it is not fatal to proceedings that no actual fear and alarm 
occurred. The test in breach of the peace is an objective one. The court 
must look at the case from the standpoint of the reasonable person as if 
he or she was observing or experiencing the conduct. It is unlikely that 
the Scottish Parliament intended to attempt to close the loophole arising 
from the judgment in Smith31 with a statutory offence that was in some 
respects more restrictive than breach of the peace, by requiring both that 
actual alarm be experienced and that a reasonable person observing the 
conduct would have had the same reaction.  
                                       
28 [2013] HCJAC 57, 2013 S.C.L 615, 2013 S.C.C.R 334, 2013 G.W.D 17-354 
29 [2013] HCJAC 96, 2014 J.C. 171, 2013 S.L.T 1100, 2013 S.C.L 832 
30 2015 [HCJAC] 2, 2015 J.C 223, 2015 S.L.T 106, 2015 S.C.L 285 
31 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
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 The decision in Jolly32 had the consequence, for a time at least, of 
rendering the offence created by section 38 of very limited practical use 
unless the threatening or abusive conduct was actually directed at the 
person who might have been expected to have been frightened by it. The 
Court appeared to have read into the section an additional condition, and 
attributed to the Scottish Parliament a restriction to its legislative intent 
that a strict reading of the section or the few public pronouncements that 
we have on its intended purpose do not seem to admit. This is in effect 
what the court subsequently held in Paterson.33 
As there were now two, apparently conflicting, decisions on the 
interpretation of section 38, a Bench of 5 judges was convened to 
consider the appeals of three appellants who were individually convicted 
of contravening section 38(1). Lord Justice General Gill delivered his 
opinion with which the Lord Justice- Clerk, Lords Brodie and Drummond 
Young and Lady Clark of Calton concurred on 14th August 2014. The court 
firstly examined the decisions in Rooney34 and Jolly35 and then considered 
the circumstances of the offences in respect of which the appellants were 
convicted. The three appeals offer a cross section of the type of conduct 
that might be expected to fall within the ambit of section 38, although 
none of them is an example of verbal domestic abuse committed in 
private- a mischief which the section sought to address. In the appeals of 
Ewan Paterson and David Bow neither complainer claimed to have 
suffered fear or alarm. 
  Paterson36 is similar on its facts to Rooney,37 but without the 
religious and sectarian aggravation. The appellant had been convicted of 
shouting and swearing and challenging police officers to fight both before 
he was arrested and while in a police vehicle. The officers present had not 
suffered fear or alarm themselves. The sheriff held that as the behaviour 
took place in public in a residential area known for youth disorder, the 
                                       
32 [2013] HCJAC 96, 2014 J.C. 171, 2013 S.L.T 1100, 2013 S.C.L 832 
33 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517 
34 [2013] HCJAC 57, 2013 S.C.L 615 
35 [2013] HCJAC 96, 2014 J.C. 171, 2013 S.L.T 1100, 2013 S.C.L 832 
36 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517 
37 [[2013] HCJAC 57, 2013 S.C.L 615, 2013 S.C.C.R 334, 2013 G.W.D 17-354 
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appellant was out of control and his behaviour could have proved a 
catalyst for further disorder, there was sufficient evidence that his 
behaviour would cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm.  
 David Bow was convicted of a racially aggravated contravention of 
section 38(1) by repeatedly shouting racial abuse and swearing at a 
complainer of Indian extraction who was in his car on the way to collect 
his daughter from school and had edged out to get past a refuse lorry that 
was blocking the road. The appellant who was one of the bin men took 
exception to this action and behaved as libelled. The complainer told the 
court that he had not suffered actual fear or alarm.   
Jamie Love was convicted of posting sectarian and abusive 
comments on his Facebook page. A woman who had seen the comments 
complained to the police and she, and the police officer to whom she had 
reported the matter, stated in evidence that they were upset and offended 
by the comments. The appellant had claimed that his comments were 
“intended as banter with mates” but admitted that his conduct was stupid.  
The Lord Justice General disposed of the three appeals in short 
order. He rejected the submissions of Counsel for each appellant that 
there was patent ambiguity in section 38(1), and that in order to ascertain 
the intention of Parliament, the court should refer to statements of the 
Secretary of State for Justice at Stages 2 and 3 of the Bill, and to the 
amendments made to it. His Lordship held that section 38(1) set out 
“three clear and concise constituents of the offence”.38  Paragraphs a and 
b set out the actus reus and paragraph c set out the mens rea 
requirement. He held that establishing parts a and b were 
“straightforward questions of fact.” 39 
 The Lord Justice- General took the view that the question under 
paragraph b was not whether the complainer suffered actual fear or 
alarm. If that had been the intention of Parliament, then that is what the 
paragraph would have said. As section 39 of the 2010 Act, which created 
a new offence of stalking, required that the accused’s behaviour caused 
                                       
38 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517 at [19] 
39 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517 at [19] 
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fear or alarm to be suffered by the target of the conduct, the court 
concluded that a conscious decision had been made to draft the sections 
differently.  It was held that that the subsection sets out an objective test. 
If the conduct admitted or proved is threatening or abusive in nature and 
it would be likely to cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm, 
then paragraph b is made out. As the Lord Justice General put it, if a 
reasonable person would have suffered fear or alarm, it follows that it is 
no defence if fortuitously no actual fear or alarm is caused to the witness 
who might be “an intrepid Glasgow police officer”. 40  The Court was in no 
doubt that Lady Smith had read an additional condition into subsection 1. 
The court refused the three appeals and held that Jolly41 had been 
wrongly decided and should be overruled. His Lordship endorsed the 
formulation of the actus reus of section 38 set out in Rooney42. To 
conclude their deliberations, the court revisited Jolly43 noting that even 
though the court had not needed to consider the defence in s 38(2) that 
the behaviour was in the particular circumstances reasonable, “had 
section 38(2) been cited it would have presented an irresistible defence to 
such an unreasonable prosecution.” At [29] 
 The objective test set out in Paterson44 is similar to that in pre 
Smith45 breaches of the peace. In Wilson, for example, Lord Dunpark 
stated “It is well settled that a test which may be applied in charges of 
breach of the peace is whether the proved conduct may reasonably be 
expected to cause any person to be alarmed upset, annoyed or to provoke 
a disturbance of the peace. Positive evidence of actual harm, upset, 
annoyance or disturbance created by reprisal is not a prerequisite for 
conviction.”46 Also, instead of the all-encompassing “disorderly” conduct 
required for breach of the peace, section 38 is more specific and possibly 
more limited in scope. This point is addressed in greater detail below. 
Discussion 
                                       
40 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517 at [20] 
41 [2013] HCJAC 96, 2014 J.C. 171, 2013 S.L.T 1100, 2013 S.C.L 832 
42 [2013] HCJAC 57, 2013 S.C.L 615, 2013 S.C.C.R 334, 2013 G.W.D 17-354 
43 [2013] HCJAC 96, 2014 J.C. 171, 2013 S.L.T 1100, 2013 S.C.L 832 
44 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517  
45 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
46 1982 SLT 361 at 362, 1982 S.C.C. R 49 
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 The decision in Paterson47 has created some certainty by clarifying 
the conditions that must be satisfied before a contravention of section 
38(1) is made out. At the time of writing there is no indication that the 
interpretation of the section is causing difficulties in the lower courts. Two 
questions remain however. Firstly does section 38 permit the prosecution 
of all instances of shouting and swearing at police officers as the Scottish 
Government seem to have intended? Secondly, do section 38 and breach 
of the peace between them cover all common or garden instances of non- 
aggravated disorderly conduct that are considered worthy of the attention 
of the procurator fiscal? This section of the article explores those 
possibilities by examining reported cases of successful appeals against 
conviction for breach of the peace to see which if any of them might have 
been appropriately prosecuted as a contravention of section 38 instead. 
The main difference between the pre Smith48 iteration of breach of the 
peace and section 38 is that s38 (1) requires that the accused behave in a 
threatening or abusive manner rather than in just any way that could 
reasonably be expected to cause fear or alarm, upset or annoyance or to 
provoke a disturbance to the peace. Hence the wide range of aggressive, 
noisy, potentially disconcerting or bizarre behaviour that featured in the 
pre Smith49 reported cases. 
 The terms “threatening” or “abusive” are not themselves defined in 
section 38 but as section 38(1) applies to “conduct of any kind including 
things said or otherwise communicated as well as things done”, the 
section appears intended to catch any behaviour that is on its facts and in 
its context threatening or abusive, including postings or electronic 
communications of the kind that may also be caught by the 
Communications Act 2003 s 127. Dictionary definitions of ‘abusive’ involve 
behaviour characterised by insulting or coarse language, habitual violence 
or cruelty. If a person or their behaviour is described as “threatening”, it 
suggests that harm, danger or pain are imminent, or there is an intention 
to inflict harm, pain or misery. Threatening behaviour has a hostile or 
                                       
47 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517  
48 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
49 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
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deliberately frightening quality that causes or may cause another person 
to feel vulnerable or at risk. Section 38 does not require that the 
accused’s behaviour is threatening or abusive to the person hearing it. 
The provision is drafted sufficiently widely to encompass behaviour that is 
threatening or abusive of, or about another person, provided it is 
witnessed and provided the conduct would be likely to cause a reasonable 
person to suffer fear and alarm.   
Kinnaird v Higson50 was decided in the light of the pre Smith51 test. 
K was convicted of breach of the peace after taking exception to being 
asked to wait until police officers checked if there was a warrant for the 
his arrest. The extent of his conduct was to swear at the officers, telling 
them only to “**** off” and trying to walk away, whereupon he was 
arrested. His conviction was quashed, as there was no evidence or finding 
to the effect that he had shouted or that his behaviour had caused or was 
likely to cause distress or alarm. Similar on its facts is Miller v Thomson52 
in which the conduct complained of consisted of the accused using 
offensive language to police officers when they approached the appellant 
and asked for his personal details without giving an explanation for doing 
so. In quashing the conviction the court observed that his actions could be 
regarded as” a mild, albeit rudely expressed, protest at what appeared to 
be wholly unjustified harassment on the part of the police officers.” [at 
15] The trial in McMillan v Higson53  was concluded before Smith54 but the 
appeal was heard after it was decided.  The accused’s conduct exemplified 
the “truculent or obdurate refusal to co-operate” with the police described 
by Lord Coulsfield in Smith.55 He used his car to prevent others, with 
whom he was in dispute, to gain access to a private road or leave the 
scene, and threw away his car keys when arrested. His conviction was 
quashed on appeal on the grounds that on the basis of the facts admitted 
or proved, no serious disturbance was likely to ensue. In the 
                                       
50 2001 S.C.C.R 427, 2001 G.W.D 16-592 
51 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
52 2009 [HCJAC] 4, 2009, S.L.T 59, 2009 S.C.L 385, 2009 S.C.C.R 179, 2009 
G.W.D 2-30 
53 2003 S.L.T 573, 2003 S.C.C.R 125, 30023 G.W.D 1-14 
54 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
55 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
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circumstances of the dispute it appeared that neighbours were in 
sympathy with the appellant.  
 In all these cases, the conduct described is of the type intended to 
be caught by section 38, at least according to the former Cabinet 
Secretary for Justice. However such behaviour is also unlikely to be 
viewed as threatening or abusive in the normal meaning of those terms as 
described above. The conduct complained of was short –lived and even 
when taken at its highest, relatively innocuous. In Kinnaird and Miller it 
also appears to have been prompted by the actions of the police officers. 
Even if the conduct was to be thought to be threatening or abusive, it is 
highly unlikely that a court would hold that the condition in s38 (1) (b) 
had also been satisfied in the particular circumstances of those cases. 
Admittedly, in Miller,56 the Justices had convicted on the basis of their 
preferred, otherwise unsupported, version of two inconsistent accounts of 
the accused’s conduct given by the police witnesses, but even so the court 
was not satisfied that the test in Smith57 had been made out. Much will 
depend on the facts, circumstances and context of each case. One brief 
instance of shouting, swearing or gesticulating at police officers in an 
otherwise empty street in the small hours of the morning is unlikely, on 
the face of it, to be considered threatening or abusive. The type of 
behaviour described Rooney58 and Paterson59, was much more severe and 
had much more scope for escalation. Furthermore, in those cases, the 
reasons for holding that the condition in section 38(1) (b) was satisfied 
were explained in the respective stated cases to the satisfaction of the 
court. The type of conduct complained of in Harris60 would now be caught 
by section 38. The things said to the police officers in private may not 
have been abusive, but they undoubtedly had a hostile or frightening 
quality and it could be inferred they were designed to dissuade the officers 
from investigating the accused’s conduct further. If the intention of the 
                                       
56 2009 [HCJAC] 4, 2009, S.L.T 59, 2009 S.C.L 385, 2009 S.C.C.R 179, 2009 
G.W.D 2-30 
57 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
58 [2013] HCJAC 57, 2013 S.C.L 615, 2013 S.C.C.R 334, 2013 G.W.D 17-354 
59 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517   
60 [2009] HCJAC 80, 2010 J.C.245, 2009 S.L.T 1078, 2010 S.C.L 56, 2010 
S.C.C.R 931, 2010 G.W.D 35-724, 2010 S.C.C.R 931, 2010 G.W.D 35-724 
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Scottish Government in passing section 38 was to render all instances of 
shouting at, or the use of bad language to police officers criminal,  then 
section 38, as currently drafted does not achieve its aim.  
 As noted, section 38 is intended to address situations where the 
conduct complained of is not as severe as is required to meet the test in 
Smith,61 or is, but takes place in private in circumstances in which it is 
unlikely to be discovered, as exemplified in Harris62 and Hatcher.63 Farrell 
v Harvie64, decided prior to Paterson65 is an example of threatening or 
abusive conduct in a domestic setting successfully prosecuted as a 
contravention of sec 38(1). The conviction was upheld to the extent that 
the appellant shouted “f***ing idiot” at his wife in an aggressive manner 
as he was being taken away by the police. The sheriff found that the 
complainer was upset when the police attended and was not “robust 
mentally or physically”. While to the disinterested outsider the conduct 
complained of in this case might appear minor, the accused spoke 
abusively to his wife and there was evidence that she was distressed. 
Much will depend on the context and circumstances however. In 
McGuinness v Brown66  the conduct complained of took place in public. It 
consisted only of the appellant approaching his estranged wife where she 
had taken refuge in her car and asking to speak to her. There was no 
disorderly conduct per se, and when it became apparent that his wife’s 
mother was calling the police, he drove off at speed. This appeal 
succeeded because the conduct itself had not met first part of the test. It 
is difficult to see how it could be a contravention of s 38 either. It differs 
from Farrell67 in that M did not shout, swear or threaten violence and his 
conduct was not abusive to or about the complainer. It may well have 
appeared extremely threatening to the complainer who had previously felt 
                                       
61 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
62 [2009] HCJAC 80, 2010 J.C.245, 2009 S.L.T 1078, 2010 S.C.L 56, 2010 
S.C.C.R 931, 2010 G.W.D 35-724, 2010 S.C.C.R 931, 2010 G.W.D 35-724 
63 [2010] HCJAC 76, 2011 J.C 90, 2011 S.C.L 114, 2010 S.C.C.R 903, 2010 GWD 
30-617 
64 [2014] HCJAC 55, 2014 S.C.L 664, 2014 G.W.D 25-483 
65 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517 
66 [2013] HCJAC 82, 2014 J.C 131, 2013 S.C.L 789, 2013 S.C.C.R 442, 2013 
G.W.D 25-484 
67 [2014] HCJAC 55, 2014 S.C.L 664, 2014 G.W.D 25-483 
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the need to seek a non- harassment order to protect herself from the 
appellant, but viewed objectively, the accused’s behaviour was not of a 
nature to draw attention to itself. In the absence of other more damning 
evidence, a court would be unlikely to hold that such outwardly innocuous 
conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm as 
required by section 38(1) (b). Similarly in the older case of Farrell v 
Normand68, the conduct consisted of beckoning a 15-year-old girl over 
and offering her a drink. Even though she was distressed by this 
behaviour, the court concluded that the conduct was not such that it 
would be likely to place a reasonable person in a state of rear and alarm. 
Again, this sort of behaviour is not on the face of it likely to be considered 
threatening or abusive, nor is it likely that the court would hold that a 
reasonable person would be likely to suffer fear or alarm as a result. 
Conclusion 
 The court in Paterson69 explained clearly how section 38(1) is to be 
interpreted. At the time of writing, no other cases have been reported 
which concerned appeals against convictions for section 38. If the Scottish 
Government intended section 38 to capture every instance of low- level 
rowdy, disorderly or unpleasant conduct that might once have been 
prosecuted as breach of the peace, then the section as drafted does not 
fully meet its policy aim. Even though the test in section 38(1) (b) as 
explained in Paterson70 appears to herald a return to the pre Smith71 
actus reus of breach of the peace in statutory form, the requirement that 
the behaviour is threatening or abusive may be its saving grace. Conduct 
that is de facto threatening or abusive in its context is narrower and more 
specific than the just about “anything goes” nature of the old common law 
actus reus of breach of the peace. Provided the court takes a robust 
approach to what is deemed to be threatening or abusive conduct in the 
context and circumstances of the case, it seems that section 38 is drafted 
narrowly enough to avoid us returning to the days when merely shouting 
                                       
68 1993 S.L.T 793, 1992 S.C.C.R 859 
69 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517  
70 [2014] HCJAC 87, 2015 J.C 118, 2014 S.L.T 857, 2014 S.C.L 606, 2014 
S.C.C.R 521, 2014 G.W.D  26-517  
71 2002 J.C. 65, 2001 S.L.T. 1007, 2001 S.C.C.R 800, 2001 G.W.D 26-1011 
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and swearing, or being rude to police officers regardless of the 
circumstances could be enough to justify a conviction. We now have a 
clear interpretation of the actus reus of section 38 which should be a 
useful addition to the prosecutor’s tool kit. However, it is to be hoped that 
no proceedings are taken without the police and procurator fiscal first 
taking careful account of the conduct complained of to satisfy themselves 
that it is indeed threatening or abusive. It is also to be hoped that accused 
persons will seek legal advice before simply accepting a conditional offer 
of a fiscal fine or pleading guilty to any accusation of minor unruly 
behaviour. Provided that police and prosecutors apply the section carefully 
there is only a small risk that Scottish courts will see the wholesale return 
of the so called “two cop breach”. However, because there may still be 
circumstances, mostly in the context of harassment or domestic abuse in 
which the conduct may in fact cause fear and alarm to a complainer and 
more importantly for the purposes of section 38, cause a reasonable 
person fear or alarm, but is not threatening or abusive in itself, the 
Scottish Government may wish to review the precise wording of the 
offence.  
  
 
